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Abstract
We assess theoretically the e¤ect of forming a free trade union
on the total production of a nation, where such e¤ects are caused
by the absorption of technologies. A popular metaphor describes
the people as crabs in a bucket because when one crab tries to
scape, the others pull it down avoiding a possible way out for all
of them. Given this knowledge, posteriorly and independently of
the income inequality levels, we extend our analyses to consider
the e¤ect of envy in a macroeconomic level on the total produc-
tion, and draw the implications which this phenomenon has on
the formation of free trade unions. We make strategic policy rec-
ommendations to allow the achievement of a globalization that
benets each member nation, where we show that the great trade
union might have to start with gradual and charitable subregional
agreements.
1 Introduction
The relation between international trade and economic growth has been
the object of many theoretical and empirical works. Lal and Rajapati-
rana (1987) focus their attention on understanding the theoretical rela-
tionship between economic growth and trade for developing economies
by testing empirical data. Vamvakidis (1998) addresses questions that
concern the relationship between economic integration and growth by
testing the robustness of this relation, and nd that it seems to be that
a main reason for nations not to grow faster when this kind of agreements
Im thankful with Lionello F. Punzo, Elvio Accinelli Gamba and Edgar J. Sánchez
Carrera for their support and comments. I was also beneted from an assistance to
the annual meeting (2015) of the Ph.D. in Economics of the Universities of Siena,
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are done is that are closed, small, and developing economies. However,
are these the only factors that inuence this relation? If not, which as-
pects of the foreign countries should a nation look at when it comes to
the search for forming a free trade union? Is there an ideal strategy to
form these unions?
In the present work we assess theoretically the e¤ect of forming this
kind of unions on the total production of a nation, considering how
also the behavior or conduct of the nationspopulation matters, which
allows us to get policy strategies to achieve the best possible globalization
regime in terms of the broadly relevant index named economic growth.
2 Free trade unions, and economic growth
The technological level of a nation i is composed by two factors, the
locally distinctive technology xi and the standard technology Bi such
that xi + Bi = Ai. What di¤erences Bi from xi is that Bi contains
technology which is also present in other nations1.
Therefore the total production can be represented with a function
Fi(Ki) that depends positively on the technological level Ai. We consider
a production function that has constant marginal returns of the capital,
where the capital is as usually treated like an homogenious good that is
compounded by all the kinds of capital such that the nation i has the
total production Yi = AiKi.
When there is a free trade union, the members adapt and absorb the
technology of the other ones, which happens throughout buying capital
goods, implementation, or other channels, and we denote the union of
free trade between two nations i and j by i [ j. Moreover, the total
production of a union i [ j is denoted by Fi(Ki) [ Fj(Kj).
There are two kinds of technological absorptions, the absorption of
standard technologies and the one of locally distinctive technologies.
The standard technology of a nation after the union is given by Bi[j =
Bi + Bj   bi[j, where bi[j = Bi \ Bj and Bj  bi[j  Bi. The locally
distinctive technology of a union is given by xi[j = xi+xj. Therefore we
get that the technological level of a union is given by Ai[j = Bi[j+xi[j.2
Theorem 1 Fi(Ki) + Fj(Kj) < Fi(Ki)[ Fj(Kj)
Proof. In order to get the total production of a union Fi(Ki)[ Fj(Kj)
we must take into account the absorption of the technologies. Therefore
1Not necessarily all the nations have the same standard technology.
2For simplicity we omit the obvious specication of the equivalence relation be-
tween the chardinality of the nite sets of technological aspects of a country i, Bi
and xi, and the real numbers which these variables also represent.
2
we can just compare the total products as it follows
AiKi + AjKj  Ai[jKi + Ai[jKj
and since Ai[j > Ai and Ai[j > Aj, surprisingly we can get that Fi(Ki)+
Fj(Kj) > Fi(Ki)[ Fj(Kj).
This theoremmeans that unions are always benecial for its members
in terms of the total production.
Conjecture 2 The union is super additive in the sense that for n ex-
isting nations [ni=1Fi(Ki) >
Pn
i=1 Fi(Ki)
This can easily be shown by following the steps of the proof of the
theorem for the n nations.
If the unions are always benecial for its members, why does it take
so long for the world to tend to the great trade union? In the following
we show some cases which illustrate how such benets may not be clear
for a country.
Case 3 When xi is slightly positive and bi[j  Bi  Bj, and there is
a union between i and j where xj is meaningfully positive, we say that
j is making a charitable agreement. Since we are dealing with macro-
economics, small variations on the total output are not meaningful, and
it can be observed that Aj  Ai[j. However in this case the di¤erence
Ai[j   Ai is meaningful and so as the benets from this union for the
nation i.
Case 4 When xi and xj are slightly positive, and bi[j  Bi  Bj, then
the union i [ j will not have signicative gains or benets for any of its
members.
From these cases we get that the strategies for making unions matter,
because the order in which a nation could form a trade agreement can
result more benecial to another nation if it decides to join. This is i[ j
could not be meaningfully benecial for j while it is for i, and the union
z [ i could be mutually benecial for z and i, with the union z [ i [ j
being benecial for all of its members.
Moreover, there could be other factors that inuence economic growth
and the formation of these unions, that could explain why some nations
may choose not to form them independently of the levels of inequality.
In the following we explain how a behavioral factor which a¤ects the
total production could be a reason for avoiding the formation of some
free trade unions among nations.
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3 Envy and economic growth (Crabs in a Bucket)
A popular metaphor describes the people as crabs in a bucket because
when one crab tries to scape, the others pull it down avoiding a possible
way out for all of them.
In this section we get in to the eld of behavioral macroeconomics to
explain a possible factor which is usually ignored by theories of economic
growth.
When the individuals invest to produce, other agents of the economy
develop a feeling popularly known as envy. We represent how the agents
do investments motivated by envy to a¤ect negatively the income of the
individuals surrounding them, because the increasing gains of the others
make them unhappy.
As in Solow (1956), there is an exogenous propensity to save s. The
savings are not equal to the capital investments because we consider
how part of the savings are utilized to destroy capital. This is s = e+ i,
where e is the e¤ect of the propensity of spending motivated by envy
and i is the e¤ective propensity to invest on capital3. e is exogenously
given and is the static result or equilibrium of a behavioral dynamic as
the one modeled by evolutive game theory, where the agents interact
learning from the others and the pay back of acting with envy increases
when these acts are more common among the population4.
We use a neoclassic production function. The capital is such that the
acquired land is also part of it, and its change equation is the following
_k = (i+ e)Ak   k
The steady levels are the following
k =

(i+ e)A

 1
1 
y = A
1
1 

(i  e)

 
1 
as we can see the e¤ect of the propensity to spend on capital destruc-
tion motivated by envy e a¤ects negatively the steady levels. Finally
notice that although there can be insecurity on the data which is col-
lected to observe how high is the envy for a country, this macroeconomic
behaviour can always be accounted by looking at the amounts of these
investments, and at the destroyed capital within an economy.
3Notice that the di¤erence between consumption and investments is as clear as
always.
4See Bowles (2006).
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4 Trade unions considering the envy of the popu-
lations
When a free trade union is done, the individuals interact and the nations
can foresee if the local population will learn and imitate from the other
nations, or the other nations will end up behaving as the locals in terms
of envy, in the same way that can foresee the technological absorption.
The nation j knows that whether its inhabitants imitate or not the
envy propensity of the nation z when the union j [ z is done, depends
on the size of the local population Lj, on the size of the population Lz,
and on how inuential or strong these envy tendencies are.
For simplicity we take for granted that the tendencies of envy expen-
ditures are equally strong or inuential in every nation. This is, a greater
population will make its propensity more likely to be imitated because
more persons will practice such propensity to spend motivated by envy,
and the a¤ected individuals will fall in the same behaviour. In this way,
if a nation has a greater population than another one, its propensity will
be the implemented one. Instead if both of the populations were equal
in size, then each nation would preserve its propensity of expenditures
motivated by envy without stability5.
We keep considering the neoclassical production function. In order to
make a union each nation projects the e¤ect of the union on its steady
state6. Therefore, for a nation j it will be benecial to form a trade
union with another one z if
(i  ej[z)Aj[z

 1
1 
>

(i  ej)Aj

 1
1 
! (i  ej[z)Aj[z > (i  ej)Aj
! i(Aj[z   Aj) > ej[zAj[z   ejAj
which means that if the increment on the investments is greater than
the increment on the e¤ect of the expenditures motivated by envy, then
it will be benecial for the nation j to form the union7.
5 Policy implications
As we saw in the previous sections, not all unions are benecial for the
nations, how ever, this can also be understood as how the order for
5As we have mentioned, this process is the result of the evolution of institutions.
6This means that the time which takes for a new behavior to be adapted is not a
concern of the policy makers.
7Notice that it results logic that i remains unchanged, because it does not depend
on social interactions, but on the decisions of the locals.
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making unions matters. This is, if a nation which has a low propensity
of expenditures motivated by envy forms a trade union with another one
with a higher propensity of this kind and a lower population, then the
lower propensity will be imitated and a posterior union with countries
which have lower populations than the previous union will have the
propensity of the previous union. But what would happen if the nation
with the lowest propensity (it could be zero) has the lowest population?
The sub regional agreements: A regime that looks for getting the
highest possible benets in the long run can look for sub regional
trade unions to be done, where after the lowest propensity has
been implemented by more people, then posterior unions could be
formed such that all nations can tend to the globalized world with
the lowest possible (or zero) expenditures which are motivated by
envy, and with all the nations being beneted. Moreover, notice
that if the nation with the lowest envy propensity has also a tech-
nological level such that its benets from forming a union with
any other nation are not meaningful, the great union would have
to start with gradual an charitable subregional agreements to reach
the best possible globalization for all the countries.
Remark 5 When a trade union is done, since the agents of all the na-
tions can invest anywhere and all the rms can access the same technol-
ogy, we get that in equilibrium all the nations employ the same capital
per worker. This is
Ai[jk 1i = r +  = Ai[jk
 1
j
for any i and j, from which we deduce that kj = ki = ki[j. Moreover,
from this we get that in equilibrium the countries in a union will have
the same per capita product.
Madsen (2009), mentions how the productivity of the countries of
the OECD converge in an intensied manner since the end of the world
war II, and basing us on our theoretical approach, we attribute this
obvious, measured, and observed phenomenon, to the increasing subre-
gional agreements between these countries. Durlauf (2003) argues that
the right way to test convergence is by specifying to what club a country
belongs, which is reinforced by our theory in the sense that the mem-
bers of a convergence club happen to have integration agreements. In
this way our theory has complemented visions as the one of Howitt and
Mayer-Foulkes (2005) who explain and identify the particular dynamics
of the converging clubs, where the formation of strategic unions could
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be the answer to scape from a divergent dynamic. Moreover, recalling
the empirical conjectures of Vamvakidis (1998), we can thus say that
the small, closed, and developing economies could have presented an
envy propensity which compensated the improvement on the technolog-
ical levels, or made unions with countries that had similar technological
levels and average expenditures motivated by envy.
Finally we do not extend our work to the analysis of monetary poli-
cies, because we consider how it is well known in the framework of eco-
nomic growth, that any kind of change on the monetary mass does not
alter the relative prices of the nal goods because of perfect competi-
tion, which means that although an old shmoo becomes lower or higher
than one, the produced goods of an economy are exactly the same, and
this means that in practice the important indicators keep being the total
production and the income distribution even for economies with perfect
discrimination in prices.
6 Conclusions
We have shown how the countries are beneted by trade unions and
how the behavior of the population is important to be considered in
order to form these regimes. Specically, we have analyzed the e¤ect of
macroeconomic envy on the total output and how if such kind of social
phenomenon was true for a nation, it could a¤ect the decisions to form
trade unions.
More specically, from the described relationship we draw policy im-
plications and strategies which would allow a globalization that benets
all the countries as much as possible, given the technology and behaviour
of these regions. For example we showed that the great union could have
to start with gradual an charitable subregional agreements, to reach the
best possible globalization for all the countries.
Finally we can interpret that if all the nations became one union,
the resulting region could have a higher per capita income, where the
strategies and order for tending to this great union matter, and the com-
positions of the local demands and the local average labor productivities
do not.
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